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“The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try 
to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is 
meant a mathematical construct which, with the 
addition of certain verbal interpretations describes 
observed phenomena. The justification of such a 
mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is 
expected to work.” [John von Neumann, 1955] 
 
Introduction 
Traditional macroeconomics and agent-based simulation (ABS) seem to be two disjunctive 
worlds, two different sprachspiele in the sense of Wittgenstein. It is not just the fact that 
macroeconomics has a long and distinguished history that on top of more than 200 years of 
discourse has recently adopted a sophisticated dynamic mathematical framework, while ABS 
is still in its infancy and for outsiders looks more like an intellectual toy than a serious 
research tool. Both languages are tools and eventually both are aiming at the same object of 
investigation: political economy. Why they let their object appear differently certainly is due 
to the intrinsic properties of the two languages. As is the case with every tool, the properties 
of the tool are to some extent transferred to the results that can be achieved with the 
respective tool. What aggravates this split of work styles is the fact that two different large 
research communities are linked to the use of the two languages; and each member of such 
a community has built already a considerable human capital stock, which consists mainly of 
elements that belong to exactly one of the two languages. Any expedition into the use of the 
foreign language runs into danger to make a part of the own toolset look obsolete, and thus 
to lose hard earned human capital. The incentives for cooperation disappear. 
To ease the pains of disaggregated research, the aim of this paper is to improve mutual 
understanding, and to show how far evolutionary macroeconomic simulation can advance 
political economy by explaining traditional macroeconomics as a (sometimes implausible) 
special case of its own more general approach. On the other hand ABS researchers often are 
unaware of the rich interpretative and empirically oriented treasures that classical 
macroeconomics has in store. What at first sight looks to be easily transferred into an 
algorithm turns out to be a highly refined argument, which in turn challenges the skills of 
ABS modelers. The most promising route to follow in the future certainly will be to be 
versatile in both languages, to walk on both feet. This short paper should provide a modest 
first step towards this goal. 
 
  
1. The traditional macroeconomic model (John Hicks) 
Conventional economic wisdom teaches that macroeconomics was invented by John 
Maynard Keynes, [Keynes, 1936], as a reaction to the economic disaster of the Great 
Depression 1929 to 1934. Closer inspection of the history of economic thought reveals that 
Keynes in many respects just returns to questions already formulated hundred years earlier 
by classical political economists. The tightly interwoven fields of economics and political 
science never had been disentangled in real life; only the economic theories of the 
marginalist school from 1874 onwards had produced a blind spot with respect to all 
theoretical elements that went beyond their favorite methodological dogma: 
methodological individualism. To cure these short-comings of prevailing economic theory 
and to arrive at aggregate considerations again, Keynes simply transferred the idea of innate 
properties of physical individuals to larger groups in society. All households in a particular 
country were inscribed a certain ‘propensity to consume’, all firm owners were characterized 
by a ‘propensity to invest’, and the like. Of course, Keynes was aware that the assumed 
socio-psychological constants he was constructing would not be constant for a longer 
period; and this is the reason why he explicitly states that his macroeconomics is a theory of 
the short-run. Indeed his theory only had to serve as underpinning for short-run intervention 
of the state in case of emergency, theoretical justification for public investment and credit 
expansion2. Nevertheless Keynes at least had readjusted the focus of economic theory back 
to a perspective which allowed for heterogeneous aggregate economic agents, in particular 
including the state. 
But Keynes was a model-builder who only used his outstanding skills in rhetoric and prose 
writing; he never ventured out to the field of mathematical modeling. To popularize Keynes’ 
theory - or what he thought to be Keynes’ theory3 – his colleague Sir John Hicks had invented 
what he later called a ‘class-room gadget’: the IS-LM model. For generations of university 
teachers in economics all over the globe this simple equation system served as the 
incarnation of what macroeconomics is about. When first shown to John von Neumann by 
his friend Oskar Morgenstern the latter remarked: “You know, Oskar, if these books (on 
mathematical economics, H.H.) are unearthed sometime a few hundred years hence, people 
will not believe that they were written in our time. Rather they will think they are about 
contemporary with Newton, so primitive is their mathematics. Economics is simply still a 
million miles away from the state in which an advanced science is, such as physics.” 
[Morgenstern, 1976]. Even today, 77 years after the publication of Keynes’ book, the Nobel 
Prize Winner of last year, Thomas Sargent, did win his Prize for a book which in principle just 
expands on the IS-LM model [Sargent, 1980]. What is even more important is the fact that 
most macro-econometric models used today for forecasting and policies consulting still in 
one way or the other are just enormously extended variants of the demand-driven IS-LM 
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 This earned Keynes an ironic comment from a critical contemporary: His ‘general theory’ is perhaps useful in 
special situations, but certainly not general. 
3
 Prose texts always are prone to generate rivalry interpretations, in Keynes’ case the war on the correct 
interpretation drags on till today. 
model. It thus seems to be an excellent methodological starting point to highlight the 
features of the ISLM equation system. 
In principle just three equilibrium conditions for the flows in three interdependent aggregate 
markets are postulated: the commodity market, the labor market, and the money market. 
Briefly consider each of them in more detail. 
1.1 The commodity market equilibrium: 
            
Total domestic demand consists of the components on the right-hand side, consumption of 
households (C), investment demand of firms (I), government expenditure (G), and net 
exports, i.e. exports (X) minus imports (I). The flow equilibrium condition reduces the focus 
to the description of situations where total demand equals domestic supply (Y), changes of 
the corresponding stock variables of the right-hand side components are assumed to be 
zero. Dynamics are added to this equilibrium condition by assuming behavioral equations for 
demand components, which take into account past values of aggregates. Note that this is 
the point where fictitious agents - like ‘the aggregate of all households’ or ‘the aggregate of 
all firms’ - are entering the picture and are assumed to possess behavioral traits which can 
be described by certain functional forms containing psycho-social constants4. The most 
important behavioral function for the ISLM model is the investment function, since it links 
the first endogenous variable, the interest rate, to investment demand (I). The second 
endogenous variable is total demand (Y), which in equilibrium is equal to total disposable 
income5 of households. On the other hand disposable income received by households can 
only be used for two purposes; it can either be saved or consumed. Remembering that all 
stocks are assumed to stay constant, it is clear that savings cannot be added to the stock 
variable of savings. They have to be a flow variable too. The obvious candidate on the right-
hand side of the equation for absorbing the flow of savings is investment demand. But 
investment demand is already described by an ‘independent’ investment function that 
pictures the behavior of the newly introduced agent ‘aggregate firms’. The precarious 
relationship between savings and investment demand therefore will need an adjustment 
brought about by market forces6, which change the interest rate and disposable income. The 
IS-curve is the set of such equilibrium pairs of the two endogenous variables. Economic 
policy of a state institution can influence the system by changing in particular government 
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 To identify and to estimate these behavioral equations is the core task of macro-econometrics. 
5
 Disposable income is income minus all taxes. In the simplest versions of the model total taxes (T) are assumed 
to be equal to total government expenditure (G) leaving the corresponding stock variable of government debt 
unchanged. If the existing (constant) debt is larger than zero, then the interest to be paid for that debt 
nevertheless will be part of the flow variable government expenditure (G).  
6
 This eventually dangerous double determination of investment already reflects Keynes’ explanation of 
possible reasons and remedies for the Great Depression: If (private) investment demand is too low, then 
government expenditure can step in, either by a temporary increase of a stock variable like government debt, 
or by influencing investment demand of ‘aggregate firms’ with lower interest rates brought about by increased 
money supply (higher credit ceilings). Increasing taxes for those with the highest ‘propensity to save’ - the rich - 
would be another, more direct solution that social-democratic Keynesians later proposed. 
expenditure (G), which would lead to a shift of the IS-curve in an ISLM diagram. But which 
point on the IS-curve will be chosen has to be determined by equilibrium forces at another 
market: the money market. 
1.2 The money market equilibrium: 
  
 
      (   )   with   
   
  
   
   
  
   
The right-hand side of the equilibrium condition again describes aggregate behavior of a 
fictitious entity, namely all ‘money holders’ in the economy. They are assumed to be 
motivated to hold money (MD) according to two incentives: (1) In case of changing needs for 
transactions that go along with the size of total demand (Y) the demand for money will 
change in the same direction (the partial derivative of function MD is positive). (2) In case of 
a change in the interest rate money demand will change in the opposite direction (the 
partial derivative of function MD is negative), since a change in the interest rate is an 
incentive to transfer holdings of money into holdings of bonds (a rise of the interest rate), or 
vice versa (a fall in the interest rate). At this point of Hicks’ story it becomes clear that an 
additional market, namely the bond market, is implicitly involved in the working of the 
market forces at the money market. It nevertheless remains invisible at first sight because it 
simply provides a mirror image of the money market enabling market adjustment: Money 
itself does not carry interest in this story, only the possession of bonds assures a positive 
interest rate (r). For a fixed real7 money supply (   ) the entity ‘money holders’ can thus 
decide how much money to hold in the form of bonds, the remaining amount being demand 
for transaction, called liquidity demand. Evidently there again exists a set of pairs of total 
income (Y) and interest rate (r), which enables equality between liquidity demand and 
existing money supply. This is the LM-curve. At the intersection of IS-curve and LM-curve the 
unique combination of total income and interest rate, which is consistent with the 
assumption of equilibrium at commodity-, money- and bond-market is determined. The 
exogenous variable via which the policy-making institution, e.g. a monetary authority, can 
influence the system here simply is the money supply. So far Hicks’ equilibrium model is a 
story about a well-functioning economy8. But so far not much has been said about 
production and employment. Indeed Keynes innovation – according to Hicks – focusses on 
the role of demand and money- and bond-market and simply adds the existing marginalist 
labor market analysis. 
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 The usual introduction of nominal money supply (m
S
) and the price level (P) in Hicks’ model at this point again 
hints at the use of the model to explore economic policy issues: Since the central bank is assumed to be able to 
influence nominal money supply only, the repercussions initiated for the price level (in more sophisticated 
versions of the model) will alter the impact on the real money supply.  
8
 Note that despite the assumption that all variables are measured in real terms, this describes a monetary 
economy – with money and bonds (compare [Hanappi, 2009] for a detailed discussion). The assumption that in 
the behavioral equations – and only those are dynamic – agents can correctly derive determine inflation rates, 
thus use real values, is just that: an assumption about the behavior of a fictitious entity.   
1.3 The labor market equilibrium: 
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This equilibrium assumption consists of behavioral equations on both sides. On the left-hand 
side the fictitious entity ‘total work force’ is offering hours of labor-time (LS). A day has 24 
hours and only a limited part of it can be offered. This offered amount nevertheless can be 
thought to be flexible, depending on the relative marginal utilities of leisure time and the 
marginal utility of the amount of commodities, which can be bought with an additional unit 
of labor-time sold. With some plausible assumptions on utility functions9 an increase in real 
wage will lead to an increase in labor supply (the partial derivative of LS is positive). 
The demand for labor-time by a fictitious ‘aggregate of all firms’ (LD) is set by considering 
profit maximization. The argument starts with the definition of profit ( ) at the level of the 
single firm: 
     (     )          
Profit is just the residuum after wage cost (   ) and capital cost (   ) have been 
subtracted from revenues (   (     )). To determine revenues a so-called production 
function has to be introduced ( (     )), which determines how much physical output (X) 
is produced by combining a certain amount of labor-time (L) with a given amount of capital 
(K) using the prevailing technology ( ). To maximize profit the first derivative of   with 
respect to L has to be zero and the second derivative must be made sure to be negative: 
  
  
   
  (    )
  
         or     
 
 
 
  (    )
  
 
Profit maximization thus implies that the real wage must be equal to the marginal 
productivity of labor-time determined by the production function of the firm. Here now 
again an empirically plausible argument about the shape of production functions sets in, 
which holds that marginal productivity of additional labor-time is monotonically decreasing. 
If one accepts this argument then a negative slope for the labor-time demand of a firm with 
respect to the real wage immediately follows10. 
To justify the aggregation of single firm behavior to an isomorph behavior of a 
macroeconomic entity and to incorporate the intricacies of the financial implications arising 
from the simultaneous conditions of optimal capital demand is not a trivial task though. In 
[Sargent, 1980] this task is achieved though at the price of rather strong restrictions on the 
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 A long (and not too fruitful) discussion of the relationship between the concepts of utility and rationality has 
been started since Neumann and Morgenstern provided the first concise formalization of the utility function 
[Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. As Morishima showed, the marginal utility of this dispute is small, since 
plausibly rational utility functions can easily be added to most different macro-models without changing their 
dynamics [Morishima, 1973].   
10
 An analogous argument for capital demand and the real interest rate can be made.  
functional form of production functions, the working of financial markets, and the setting of 
information and communication requirements. 
Restricting attention now to the equilibrium in the labor market, the intersection of labor-
time demand and labor-time supply, a certain real wage and a certain employment level (L) 
will be fixed. Inserting this level of employment in the production function will provide the 
amount of physical output. Dividing the nominal total supply at the left-hand side of the 
commodity market equilibrium by this physical total output finally determines the price 
level. In this way the simplest Keynesian model is closed, all endogenous variables are 
determined. The exogenous variables fall into two groups: those controlled by state 
institutions (G and mS) and those not controlled and used to describe the general economic 
environment. 
Of course, this model has experienced almost infinite extensions and improvements11, not to 
speak of the endless debates concerning the question if it really captures what Keynes 
intended to say. 
1.4 The general framework 
The structure of the family of dynamic models in the ISLM tradition is straight forward and 
allows for what is called comparative dynamics. The model itself is a difference-differential 
equation system composed of equations, which are econometrically estimated with 
historical time series of the geographical region under consideration12. 
Simulation using this model, i.e. assuming that its structure remains valid, typically starts 
immediately after the last observed year and produces predictions13 for all endogenous 
variables. To do so, the future trajectories also have to be specified. This specification usually 
falls into two groups: The first group concerns exogenous variable which are controlled by 
economic policy, the second group are exogenous variables, which are not controlled and 
fall under the category of ‘general economic environment’. With different sets of these 
trajectories different simulation runs can be produced and compared (hence the name 
comparative dynamics). The most enlightening cornerstones of simulation runs finally are 
highlighted and are called scenarios. 
As already mentioned, in practice the overwhelming majority of economic simulation at a 
macroeconomic level still follows this methodological approach. 
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 For an early version of a slightly extended ISLM model that was used to simulate the Austrian economy see 
[Hanappi, 1983]. A more fine-grained extension combining input-output analysis with a more detailed 
monetary sector and some global influences on technological progress was presented in another simulation 
study on the influence of the information sector [Hanappi, 1997].  
12
 In this area additional data and new econometric methods probably most progress has been made.  
13
 Another rather dubious debate surrounds a postulated difference between forecasts and scenarios. For some 
researchers it seems to be important to distinguish between assigning a certain probability to a set of future 
exogenous, not-controlled variables (forecasts) - or avoiding to do so (scenarios). This has to be strictly kept 
apart from the measurement of econometric significance of the macro-econometric model, which has always 
to be provided.   
2. Transition to Agent-Based Simulation 
In this part some crucial extensions of the basic framework are thoroughly discussed. They 
build on obvious short-comings of the standard model and try to explore possible changes 
that on the one hand lead not too far away from standard modeling but on the other hand 
are courageous enough to point to the desiderata, which agent-based modeling should try 
to deliver. 
2.1 Government debt in a closed system 
The large aggregate money flows within a closed system during a given time unit (e.g. a year) 
can be described with the following circular flow diagram. 
 
Diagram 1: Monetary flows in a closed economy 
This diagram is a substantially enhanced and augmented variant of the circular flow 
diagrams usually displayed in macroeconomic textbooks, which in turn go back to Quesnay’s 
famous tableau economique.  
The households in the centre of diagram 1 are divided into four groups (HS,HFC, HFO, and HL) 
to enable the consideration of explicit class and intra-class conflicts. The households of the 
labour class are aggregated as HL, whereas the households of the ruling class are split up into 
three different fractions: HFO (households of Firm Owners), HFC (households of those who 
govern the processes of Finance Capital), and HS (households of those who act as the 
executive committee of the ruling class on state level). 
Furthermore three sets of institutions of the ruling class are distinguished: The set of firms 
(called ‘F’, consisting of all means of production), the set of banks (called ‘B’, consisting of all 
financial intermediaries including private insurance companies and the like), and the set of 
state institutions (called ‘S’, consisting of all public social institutions providing infrastructure 
for the maintenance of coercive power, e.g. police and law system, for health education 
standards, for public transport, and the like). These institutions are on a different 
institutional level than households and always reflect the current state of the class struggle 
in a very specific way. 
The two blue arrows leading from each of these institutions to two different types of 
households represent the respective wage payments (wF, wB, wS), and corresponding profit 
flows (πF, πB, πS). Note that in this scheme state institutions are thought to be able to 
redistribute a part of the overall socially produced profit to their leading executive agents. 
The red arrows leading from each household type to the state node indicate taxes (tL, tFO, tFC, 
tS). The other part of state revenues – two more red arrows - comes from taxes collected 
directly from the institutions (tF and tB). Total taxes then are used to be spent on 
government expenditures (called ‘GE’ in the diagram). The diverse money flows of 
government expenditure are displayed as six dotted blue arrows (call them gL, gFO, gFC,gS, gF, 
and gB), each thought to depict how much is allocated to each of the six possible recipients 
(HL, HFO, HFC, HS, F, B). Since many kinds of infrastructure expenditure are public goods it 
cannot be directly observed how the different quantities represented by the dotted blue 
lines should be disentangled. Nevertheless it is conceptually clear and the spent amounts are 
given in the state’s accounting system. 
All households are spending the money they receive partly on consumption. The green 
arrows leading from the households to a node called ‘D’ (aggregate effective Demand) show 
that consumption easily can be considered as an anonymous process14. 
Since total consumption represents total revenues of firms (the thick green arrow, call it ‘R’) 
firm owners profits can be derived as residual after subtracting all cost (outgoing arrows 
from node F). 
It now only remains to explain the interaction with financial intermediaries, the orange 
arrows. The central idea is that banks hold accounts of each of the nodes (excluding node D, 
which is only a didactic device): HL, HFO, HFC, HS, F, B, S. For all negative accounts (debts) 
banks receive income proportional to the interest rate on credits they charge, and on all 
positive accounts they have cost proportional to the interest rate on savings they have 
agreed to pay. The dotted orange lines thus have arrows in both directions, they may signal 
a new credit or withdrawal of saved money as well as new saving or a repayment of an 
existing debt. Diagram 2 shows a typical situation for a rich OECD country. 
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 This is the entry point for consumption functions, which work with an average ‘propensity to consume’ of a 
‘total population’. This so-called ‘social-psychological constant’ makes income structures disappear. A first 
critique of this assumption was Kaldor’s introduction of two different propensities for workers and firm 
owners.    
 The net income of banks stemming from transforming savings of one group into credit for 
another group therefore crucially depends on the different interest rates it charges for 
credits (e.g. iF
C, iS
C) and the interest rates it offers for savings (e.g. iL
S, iFO
S, iFC
S, iS
S). After 
subtracting from this net income taxes and wages for bank employees, and adding all 
subsidies banks receive from the state (directly and indirectly via government expenditure) 
again bank profits of bank owners can be derived as residual. This profit then is the money 
flow, which will change the money stock of the banking industry itself (not shown in diagram 
2). To maximize the relation between this final profit and the already existing (positive) stock 
of money of financial intermediaries - i.e. to maximize accumulation of this stock – is the 
goal variable of banks. To a certain extent it contradicts the goal variable of firm owners 
since its instruments (high interest on credits, low interest on savings) undermine the ratio 
between firm owners’ profits and their accounts (negative DF, positive SFO) at the banks. 
‘Finance capital’ versus ‘industrial capital’ has been a permanent conflict between fractions 
of the ruling class at least since World War 1. 
A similar conflict within the ruling class arises between state and banks. Again high interest 
on credit for public debt (iS
C) plus low interest on savings (iS
S) will force on this fraction of the 
ruling class a reduced income – at least if it is unable to put the burden on the labour force 
by increasing wage taxes or reducing those government expenditures going mainly to the 
labour class. In a similar way the fraction of firm owners could defend its profit rate by 
reducing (real) wages15, thus increasing exploitation at the level of production units. 
The finally discussed node of financial intermediaries therefore highlights class 
contradictions as well as intra class conflicts. It explains why a common action of all fractions 
of the ruling class to reduce government debt is necessarily leading to class struggle actions, 
which might shift the income distribution severely in favour of the ruling class. 
Methodologically this is important for three reasons: (1) It shows that the income 
distribution is a dependent variable, an epiphenomenon, at best an index showing how far 
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 The role of price-wage dynamics has not been discussed here since in the context of a static review of the 
circular flows observed ex post it is of minor explanatory power. In a mid-run consideration it certainly can lead 
to important indices of labour movement influence.    
the labour movement was able to get influence on decisions in a capitalist state. (2) The link 
between flow variables and stock variables in capitalism is always mediated via this node, 
the stock of social value accumulated at a certain point of time (usually possessed by a 
fraction of the ruling class) is expressed as a symbol in a sign system (money), which in last 
consequence is enforced by direct coercive power organized by the state fraction of the 
ruling class. (3) The scope of a closed system (best imagined as presenting the global political 
economy) is sufficient for some interesting conclusions (see above), but fails to give any idea 
about the evolution of political economy. In particular the reasons for a crisis cannot be 
detected without introducing the time dimension.  Additional to the static retrospection of 
necessary accounting identities during the last observed period the dynamic relations 
expressing production processes as well as expectation processes governing behaviours have 
to be included to provide a more adequate picture. 
 
2.2 Inflation and the quantity theory of money 
The simplest version of the basic ideas of the quantity theory of money can be described by 
the following story: Imagine a society, which consists only of two kinds of owners of 
commodities: those who own commodity A (e.g. ‘corn’) and those who own commodity B 
(e.g. ‘olives’). The number of owners of group A and group B is equal, and all owners prefer 
to consume a certain mix of commodities A and B to the consumption of the commodity 
they possess only. By the choice of qualitative units (e.g. the weight of ‘corn’ and the volume 
of olives) of the two commodities the optimal mix can be characterized by a ratio of A to B. 
For example: ‘Everybody likes 2 units of olives with one slice of bread (made with the flower 
of one unit of corn) best’. To possess this ratio of commodities the two groups have to 
exchange parts of their possession at a certain exchange ratio, call it xr. It means that one 
unit of A (e.g. ‘corn’) is planned to be exchanged for xr units of B (e.g. two units of ‘olives’). 
Assume further that the group possessing A owns qA units and the group owning B possesses 
qB units, and – to postpone the discussion of excess dynamics – the ratio between qA and qB 
happens to be optimal, i.e. 
  
  
    (in the example xr, ‘olive units per bread units’, is 2). For 
a given ratio xr thus          , and the amounts which the commodity owners want to 
exchange can be 
  
 
 and 
  
 
 respectively. Direct barter of this kind would make all owners 
happy. 
But since a quantity theory of money needed to involve money, it had to assume that money 
exists. Nevertheless it neither explains its emergence nor the forms it can take. At best 
macroeconomic textbooks mention that money enables a decoupling of direct commodity 
exchange: Taking money instead of another commodity enables the seller to exchange with 
somebody who owns money, and who not necessarily owns the commodity the seller needs. 
For the purpose of describing the quantity theory of money it can safely be ignored how 
money ownership in the course of social evolution has emerged. All it needs is that the 
commodity owners possess amounts of money, call them mA and mB, which they use to 
purchase what they do not possess. 
And finally the goal of the quantity theory of money, namely to explain the development of 
prices, needs an argument how prices are emerging. And in this case again, the ignorance 
with respect to price setting in actually observed markets is surprising: It is assumed that the 
fixed amount planned by owners of A to be exchanged,  
  
 
  , encounters a fixed amount of 
money planned by buyers (owners of B), mB, and exchange takes place! The price of one unit 
of A then merely has to be calculated as    
   
  
  and the price of one unit of B in an 
analogue way will be     
   
  
 . 
With these ingredients the main conclusion of the quantity theory of money already is 
visible. Changing the amount of money (e.g. doubling mA and mB) for a given level of output 
(qA and qB constant) will imply a proportional development of prices (e.g. pA and pB will also 
double). To arrive at the formula usually presented in macroeconomic textbooks just one 
more element is missing: the velocity of money, called v. In the simple setting presented it 
refers to the fact that all money units change hands only once, but one could also assume 
that exchanges are sequential and the same money units are used more often during the 
given time interval. If mA is equal to mB and money changes hands only once the emerging 
prices would be the same as in a case where only owners of B have mB (mA is zero), change 
first and thus set mA to mB enabling the second step of exchange, with which they get mB 
back. In the latter case money changes hands twice and the amount of money needed is only 
half. This inverse proportionality finally leads to the famous formulation: 
           
or using the variables already introduced 
(     )       
  
 
    
  
 
 
As the right-hand side of the two formulas show there still remains the problem of 
computing an overall price index P and a corresponding ‘real’ amount of quantitative output 
Y ready for exchange; not to speak of the much deeper problem of what could be counted as 
money and how it could be aggregated on the left hand side. 
It can be doubted that the quantity theory of money would have attracted much attention if 
it had not been used again and again to underpin strong policy measures. Its strong and 
implausible assumptions make it a vague construct, and it is exactly this property which 
opens up a wide range of interpretations. This is also the reason why it has been explain in 
such detail in the preceding paragraphs: Each of the numerous omissions and inadequate 
assumptions provides a route to an important insight – and to show this insight is blurred by 
the on-going use of uncritical variants of this theory. In what follows some of these possible 
insights are sketched. 
First and easiest of all is the idea that evidently a prominent role for exchange of 
commodities does only make sense if division of labour in society exists. But division of 
labour implies sophisticated organization on an aggregate level, i.e. a diversity of social 
institutions. Even tribes of hunters and gatherers were held together by institutionalized 
rules of behaviour. But in the model of the quantity theory of money there is only one 
institution, the property right of owners of a commodity; they are assumed to possess 
something without being challenged and without explanation where it came from and how it 
is secured. 
Second, division of labour within a community necessarily implies that there has to be a 
common element, which holds together the bundle of commodities and services that is 
divided. There has to be the idea of social value ascribed by the members of society to each 
element of this bundle. 
Third, combining the former two hidden assumptions, there has to be group – call it the 
state-fraction of the ruling class – institutionalizing itself by monopolizing coercive power 
and forcing the latent idea of social value of commodities to become a manifest material 
sign system, i.e. money. This political (i.e. power centralizing) authority thus becomes the 
monetary authority, which injects money into the commodity producing society. 
The immediate conflict between this state fraction of the ruling class and the fraction 
extracting surplus via exploitation directly during production is unavoidable. It expresses 
itself as the fight for a division of powers within the ruling class, or in modern terminology: 
‘for an independent central bank’. And it is based on the fact that a strong enough political 
ruler can produce money for his soldiers - thus creating exchangeable signs of social value – 
with which soldiers could buy commodities of all kinds. Since the quantitative amount of 
output would remain constant, this would imply a rise in prices (the part visible – though 
distorted - in the quantity of money) but also a redistribution of commodities away from civil 
society towards ‘all the king’s men’ (the invisible part that motivates the economic policy 
debate between fractions of the ruling class). From a methodological point of view this is a 
nice bridge to the next point, namely what is meant by the just introduced concept of 
exploitation. 
To answer this, another deficiency of the quantity theory of money is a good starting point: 
How do prices emerge? Assume that the state fraction of the ruling class can assure that the 
owners of the means of production (the second fraction of the ruling class) can maintain 
their possessions and thus are also owners of the commodities produced. In that case the 
price that these owners can ask for exchanging a unit of their commodity is their instrument 
variable. The difference between this price and the cost they had to produce this unit is their 
profit. Considered as aggregate class fraction any exchanges within the group (for any given 
price level) have to cancel out – one members (seller) profit is equal to another members 
(buyer) loss – therefore profits of the class fraction cannot arise from exchanges within the 
class. The only possible strategy for maximizing class profit is to make the difference 
between price and labour cost as large as possible. This force of class oppression, measured 
as the ratio of total revenues to wage sum and called surplus rate, is what can be considered 
as ‘exploitation of man by man’. The price mechanism expressed in the quantity theory of 
money is completely blind in this respect16.  
At the zenith of the upswing of the labour movement, after the victorious Russian revolution 
and the breakdown of capitalism in the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes in 1936 
clearly saw the need for a revision of the dominant ideological doctrine, the quantity theory 
of money, in order to save capitalism. Instead of fighting for tight money supply to reduce 
the share of surplus sucked away by the state fraction injecting new money, he opted for 
using the price mechanism, i.e. inflation, to reduce the real wages of workers whose nominal 
wages could be kept constant if union power was broken. This not only is a more 
sophisticated way to increase exploitation, it also brings into play a new fraction of the ruling 
class: Financial intermediaries (banks), which could organize a very special type of price level 
increase by creating credit money for firm owners17. By founding their own profit on a share 
of expected future profit of firm owners, this new fraction of the ruling class was allowed to 
create signs of social value, i.e. money, in the presence. What Keynes analysed was already 
becoming common practice and had been predicted by Rudolf Hilferding in his book ‘Das 
Finanzkapital’. But for economic theory, as always a latecomer, the ‘Keynesian revolution’ 
added a new element to the quantity theory of money, namely ‘liquidity demand’. An 
additional conflict within the ruling class was an in-built feature of this proposal. The higher 
the claim of the banking fraction on future profits (measured as interest rate of credits), the 
less remains for firm owners – in the future. But in the presence the firm owners can use the 
new money to improve their exploitation conditions, and the banking fraction just gets paid 
out of existing profits to acquire a share the existing output – reducing the shares of 
everybody else. In Keynesian macroeconomic models the dependence of money demand on 
interest rates, i.e. the formalization of this conflict, dominates the remainder of the quantity 
theory of money, now called the transaction demand for money. During the three decades 
after 1945 Keynesian macroeconomics managed to become the mainstream of economic 
theory without ever being forced to make explicit the conflicts between classes and class 
fractions. The most important element why this was possible seems to be the mathematical 
language which was used to disguise the political economy to which it referred in the real 
world. 
With the third fraction of the ruling class, financial intermediaries, some new elements of 
political economy became essential. A credit is a contract, thus a part of the prevailing law 
system, which in turn is secured by the state monopoly of coercive power. Without a strong 
enough state fraction of the ruling class no credit banking can take place. Furthermore a 
credit creates new purchasing power that is an additional claim on current output, shrinking 
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 Whatever the state fraction of the ruling class extracts via taxes from owners of means of production is taken 
from the profit made by exploitation. A common economic program of the ruling class fractions thus has to 
insist on direct state-organized exploitation with wage-taxes and reduction of government expenditure for the 
workers. This is part of the permanent sublimate class struggle in OECD countries since 1945. 
17
 As an inspection of Keynes writings shows he rather saw the level of credit volume as the essential 
instrument for monetary policy, and not the money supply. The crude concept of money supply changes was 
only introduced in later formalizations of Keynes’ view by John Hicks. More recently David Romer has started a 
new initiative to save parts of the Keynes-Hicks IS-LM model [Romer, 2000]. 
the shares of all those without credit. In other words, credit redistributes purchasing power 
constituting thus redistributive power of the banking fraction of the ruling class18. Summing 
up the stream of promised future repayment receives the name ‘debt’, another magical 
word these days - though it is only the result of a simple arithmetic operation with numbers 
in contracts. The problem comes with two properties of the expected process: (1) As every 
future event it might simply not occur, and (2) even if it occurs it is not sure what will 
constitute social value at a future point of time. To reduce the risk of the bank a further item 
agreed upon in the contract, called collateral, becomes important. The collateral is 
something representing social value in the present, which could be transferred to the 
creditor in the case of a failing future repayment. Since in the course of evolution of financial 
instruments, of securitization (compare (Hanappi & Rengs, 2008)), contracts themselves can 
be used as collaterals the creation and redistribution of money and purchasing power 
becomes an extremely fluid process. 
But not only the notion of a clear-cut amount of money supply, as it is used in the quantity 
theory of money, has evaporated in thin air. Also the velocity of money - originally 
conceptualized as the number of times that a silver coin in one year on the average changes 
hands – has lost its meaning in the era of electronic sign systems of social value. It indeed is 
astonishing how an antediluvian theory like the quantity theory of money can invade 
contemporary comments on the financial crisis. The only explanation might be that behind 
its veil of simplicity there are vested interests of its user, who aims to address (and to 
impress) a completely uninformed audience. 
 
2.3 Production and distribution  
This part provides a small model to explain how two processes can be understood, which 
have not been dealt so far.  
The first process concerns the neglect of dynamic interaction that necessarily is assumed in 
the type of Keynesian macroeconomic accounting schemes like the one presented above. 
These schemes are derived ex post from empirically observed aggregate flows of money in a 
certain closed economy during a by-gone year. Any prediction of what will happen next year 
can build on such a sequence of past events, but it must be clear that this only is possible 
due to the intervention of model building social agents transforming datasets of past events 
into sets of expectations for relevant future variables. Keynes simple assumption in this 
respect was that large groups in a certain country (e.g. ‘consumers’) have an innate socio-
psychological constant (e.g. a ‘propensity to consume’) which will stay constant – at least for 
the next few years. The assumption of socio-psychological constants might serve as a first 
short-run hint (substituting assumptions on more elaborate expectation formation 
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 This, of course, challenged the state fraction of the ruling class, which used to manage redistribution. 
Moreover redistribution by credit did not have to observe the feedback from political election processes in 
democracies. Banks are private firms, showing to what their notion of privacy indeed comes up to: Not being 
forced to consider other goals than the firm’s profit maximization.  
processes) for highly traditional societies, where neither actual production conditions nor 
the communication environment change too fast. But for the contemporary global political 
economy, which experiences a quantum jump in the communication and information 
environment as well as a dramatic change in production structures, there certainly can be no 
short-cut assumption on how expectations are formed. So the first task is to show that today 
social dynamics always have to include a sophisticated view on expectation formation.  
The second loose end – closely linked to the first one – is the fact that so far only money 
flows were considered19. There was no link to physical quantities of goods or labour time. 
Indeed the previous section aimed to destroy the quantity theory of money by showing that 
its central equation is used to provide an inadequate link between quantities exchanged and 
their monetary mirror image. If this is accepted, then this type of link has vanished – and this 
creates the need to formulate a new link between the abstract world of money forms and 
hard physical realities of human individuals and their material environment. The evident 
candidate to formulate this link, of course, is the expectation formation process of social 
agents! They use their internal models - which are to a large extent based on monetary 
variables - to choose their actions, which then are actions in the physical economic world. 
What happens in their mental models (how they look like, how they are exchanged, how 
they change) is of utmost importance20. 
The nutshell model that follows cannot hope to meet the high aspirations formulated in the 
last two paragraphs. It can only help to stimulate further theoretical work along its lines. A 
straight forward starting point is diagram 1. If at the end of a year firm owners formulate 
and solve their internal models to determine what actions to set in the coming year they 
base their decisions on expectations. The most important expectations are those concerning 
exogenous variables (not controlled by the single firm owner) and they usually are 
predictions of time series of monetary variables (e.g. effective demand, interest rates, taxes, 
etc.). For firm owners the one essential monetary goal variable is the profit rate, the whole 
model centres on explaining its future development. So use diagram 1 to describe how it is 
connected to other monetary flows. In the case of general indebtedness of firms (a usual 
assumption supported by empirical observation) incoming and outgoing monetary flows of 
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 Keynes again sensed the difficulty: As he emphasized the short-run in the first case (‘In the long-run we are 
all dead.’), he explicitly underlined that all aggregates he considered are in real terms, i.e. all social agents are 
always perfectly able to transform variables of the world of money into variables in the world of physical 
interactions. With this tricky assumption, which for certain arguments Keynes could modify, an explicit 
consideration of price and wage formation could be circumvented. Contrary to the traditional view that 
equilibrium assumptions are made to provide equilibrium prices based on physical properties of agents 
(marginal changes of utilities meeting marginal technical production properties) this perspective leads to the 
view that ‘equilibrium’ is used as a theoretical short-cut to determine the set of real quantities for given (past) 
price and wage observations.  
20
 Even the economic mainstream seems to recognize the relevance of this issue for today’s information 
society: A recent (2002) Nobel Prize winner, Daniel Kahneman, has concentrated on explaining thought 
processes used by decision makers (Kahneman et al., 2002). Unfortunately the bad old spell of methodological 
individualism seduced him to focus mainly on the individual human person. 
the firm owners’ node are equalized by a change in the corresponding stock variable21 called 
firm debt,   
 : 
   (   
       
 )     
     
    
    
       
                             [1]     
If revenues from sales (  ) have been too small to cover total expenditure (right hand side of 
equation [1]), then the stock of monetary wealth of the firms (   
 ) has to be reduced to 
cover expenses. Total expenditure consists of profits going to firm owners’ households 
(  
  ), wages and salaries going to labourers’ households (  
 ), net taxes22 going to the state 
(  
 ), and the interest that has to be paid for existing debt (  
       
 ). Note that this simple 
consideration already includes a dynamic element, namely the fact that the change in the 
stock variable that takes place at this point of time (at the end of the year) will prevail till the 
next accounting checkpoint (the end of the next year). During this future period it will 
change the interest on the expenditure side, and eventually it might hit credit limits that call 
into question the very existence of a firm – pointing at the role of creditors mediated by 
another agent, banks. 
Now turn to the goal variable profit rate (  
 ), defined as the ratio between profits (  
  ) and 
capital stock (  
 ): 
  
   
  
  
  
                                                                                [2] 
In definition [2] capital stock   
 has to be a monetary value to enable division23. To derive 
this monetary value, and to understand why the profit rate is a goal variable at all, it is 
necessary to make a transition to the world of material hardware: In this physical world what 
appears as monetary value   
  might include a factory, or any other kind of production unit, 
which hardly can be disentangled into the components of which it is composed. In the 
contemporary (capitalist) mode of production to assign a monetary value to such a 
production unit thus again is a subtle expectation building process. The essential reason for 
owning a firm is to have the legal right to employ workers whose labour enables sales, which 
then turn into revenues as much as possible higher than total cost. A better firm therefore is 
a firm which promises more physical output for given labour input than its competitor. The 
notion of exploitation thus is already visible on the level of material interactions, but it is 
difficult to measure: labour time input comes with different qualities; the question how to 
measure physical output quantity is even more complicated and intriguing. As the practice of 
capital stock estimates of statistic offices shows certain heuristic procedures have been 
adopted that mainly take into account the observed past surplus rate and the speed of 
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 A more equilibrium oriented methodology might look at equilibrium forces that drive the system quickly to 
flow equilibrium instead of admitting changes in stocks. It is evidently impossible to describe accumulation with 
such an approach, it only allows for consideration of possible equilibrium forces for exogenously given relations 
between stock owners.  
22
 Net taxes are all transfers to the state minus all payments (subsidies) received from the state. 
23
 In what follows the role of the labour theory of value is not touched upon and all rates are plainly computed 
using monetary variables as they actually appear. 
(technological) depreciation via innovation that takes place in this segment of the economy. 
Both elements deserve special attention. 
The surplus rate (  
 ) is defined as the ratio between surplus (i.e. total revenues   
  
exceeding wages  
 ) and these wages:  
  
   
  
    
 
  
  ,                                                                                   [3] 
Last year’s surplus rate is taken as an index for how well the exploitation process has worked 
last year. This evaluation comprises many firm level measures (from maintaining work 
discipline to successful marketing activities) but also is influenced by general economic 
conditions (e.g. a general rise in unemployment will drive down wages and for given 
revenues – e.g. via export sales – increase the surplus rate).  
The impact of fast technological progress is rather obvious. Again the argument is 
immediately visible on a physical level: If a firm introduces a new superior production 
process24 this implies that the same work force can provide more physical output. For all 
other firms using the old technology this means that their exploitation possibilities will 
decrease, be it e.g. because of a shrinking market share or due to higher wages enforced by 
the market leader. To measure the physical impact of innovation is only possible at the level 
of a single firm; again it is only the shadow of the conglomerate of diverse processes on the 
world of monetary flows, which gives an idea of what is going on. In this case it is the 
distinction between high growth industries with rapidly increasing labour productivity on the 
one side, and slowly growing (service) industries with tighter limits to labour productivity 
increases which can help statistical offices. But why is there a force pushing labour 
productivity to increase at all? 
The fundamental crux of determining the motivation for this has to go back to quantities of 
goods and time spent again, and has to introduce the notions of power, exploitation and 
social class. In short, as history vividly shows a certain group within a society (the ruling 
class) usually is able to use coercive power – or just the threat of using coercive power – to 
force the rest of society to spend additional time for labour activities, which then 
materializes as additional goods and services to be consumed by the ruling class25. This 
process is called ‘exploitation’ and the motive for exploitation is the simple fact that 
spending time for consumption is preferred to spending time for labour. To work is 
considered by any ruling class as a disutility, if it has the possibility to force others to work 
instead of them, then this possibility is exploited. Even the surveillance of the exploitation 
process early on has been delegated to specially trained (usually less exploited) groups of 
workers nowadays often called ‘managers’. Power in its purest form thus is based on the 
possibility to do direct physical harm to an individual. Direct coercive power is the bottom 
line of exploitation. In today’s highly organized societies it manifests itself as the power of 
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 The argument for product innovation is in this respect completely analogous. 
25
 Compare (Veblen, 1899) for an early historical perspective on the habits of ruling classes.  
military and police. In last consequence these are the specialized managers keeping the 
exploitation process running. Fortunately enough the civilization process of the last two 
hundred years has been driven by an increasing influence from the social class opposing the 
ruling class, namely the exploited class, too. Class struggle appearing in many different forms 
has led to a state administration fraction of the ruling class, which sometimes is inclined to 
consider a trade-off between lower exploitation for less open conflict, causing frictional cost. 
Surplus product in different production units has to be distinguished from surplus in value 
terms, from money which could be used to buy anything desired. And it is the latter which is 
most useful for the members of the ruling class. It is the money amount generated by total 
sales, which characterizes the success of exploitation of a production unit. Two different 
indices might be used to derive measures that indicate success per unit of input, eliminating 
direct influence of the size of the production unit. One index is the already discussed surplus 
rate (  
 ), which measures monetary surplus per monetary unit spent for labour time. The 
second index is the profit rate, which is defined as the ratio between total sales and a 
monetary value, which the fact of possessing the production unit represents (  
 ). Again it 
has already been defined above. The innovative turn of the argument now is that these two 
dimesionless ratios can be used to construct ‘real’ economic values for the quantitative 
growth potential of means of production and labour.  
Single owners of production units in principle choose actions that can be summarized in the 
following three domains: innovation, price setting, and wage setting. The choices in all three 
areas are highly interdependent and are based on an internal model, which produces 
expected values of all variables considered to be essential. Moreover the internal models 
used by firm owners are not only exchanged between them, they also are partially amplified 
by a media environment that uses most advanced ICT. It is needless to say that a detailed 
treatment of these processes goes far beyond the scope of this text. What can be concluded 
here is the following. 
Using the terminology of input-output analysis26 based on quantities (physical technical 
coefficients27,   
   
, and a matrix of labour time input coefficients of different labour 
quality,   
    )  the goal to do innovation - and thereby to achieve the highest possible surplus 
rate – is equivalent either to a reduction of these coefficients weighted by their respective 
prices and wages (process innovation), or by the introduction of a new row and column in 
the I-O-matrix which has the property that its surplus rate is higher than the prevailing one 
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 Input-output analysis has its roots in classical political economy (see [Kurz, 2011]) and nowadays is an 
appropriate analytical tool to grasp the intricate relationships between physical quantities and sign systems. 
Combined with heterogeneous agent-based simulation techniques it should provide the most valuable tool for 
political economy. 
27
 Extending most conventional interpretations of IO analysis, it here has to be noted that these technical 
coefficients not only consist of intermediate products produced by other industries, but also natural resources 
that have to be depleted to produce a unit of production. This becomes important as soon as resources are 
approaching exhaustion, even if no firms or prices are involved – there are quantitative, physical constraints.   
(product innovation). The first set of decisions, innovation decisions, therefore can be 
expressed as 
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 (   
        
     )           
}                             [4] 
The new production program28 will either be the same as in the previous period or will be 
changed to a new program,     
 (   
     
   
     
), depending on the value of the innovation 
trigger       . A superscript ‘*’ indicates that a variable is an expected variable, expected at 
the time given in the time subscript. Keeping in mind that a production program introduced 
like this leads to a well-specified physical amount of output units (        
 ), the pivotal 
element      
 
 for a certain firm f can be described as follows. 
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All variables of the first term on the right-hand side, the price-wage system (of the whole 
economy) as well as the physical variables are expected values derived from an internal 
mental model describing the economy – an internal model not further specified here. The 
second term on the right hand side describes the surplus rate that is to be expected if 
physical properties of the production program are left unchanged. Note that the price-wage 
variables to be expected are not remaining constant but now are assuming different 
expected values, superscript ‘**’,  than in the first term. Again the expectation formation 
process has to remain in the black box in this text29. Taking heterogeneous physical 
innovation possibilities serious, at any point in time there will be a certain non-empty subset 
of firms doing innovation. Since the second term also contains expected values influenced by 
other firms actions it may well occur that many firms are forced by general developments to 
innovate (swarming effect) or may also be hindered to carry out already pending innovations 
by the current context (from stagnation to depression). Since all price-wage decisions are set 
by agents using mental models, the role of real variables is limited to the role they play in 
these models. Nevertheless their size can be derived at each point in time. And as they are 
reported via public and private media, e.g. the number of people without employment, or 
CO2 emissions, they might exert a feedback on expectation formation. 
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 A production program (an algorithm) substitutes and improves the notion of a production function used in 
conventional economic theory. 
29
 It evidently has to be formalized as a rather complicated strategic game implying irreversibility of time. As 
Ping Chen writes ‘For academic economists, a fundamental shift in theoretical tastes is essential for the 
advancement of economic science. In the era of complexity science, we have the rare chance to find an 
analytical solution for non-linear systems. Computer simulation and graphic representation will play an 
increasing role in theoretical and empirical analysis.’ [Chen, 2010, chapter 2.6.1]. Inspiration on how to proceed 
can also be found in [Prigogine, 2003, pp. 22-44].  
Without the underpinnings of a full-fledged agent-based model translating these micro- and 
meso-level ideas30 into aggregate macro-dynamic elements is a daring task. Nevertheless the 
following hypothesis concerning the expectation formation process of firm owners seems to 
be plausible. First define the aggregate innovation potential of the all firms’      : 
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                                                                         [6] 
This potential is the share of innovative firms (     
   ) in all firms, where each firm is 
weighted by the sum of its employment share (  
 
) and its share in revenues (  
 
). Evidently 
this is a dimensionless number, with             , and it takes care of physical size (using 
employment shares) as well as monetary size (using revenue shares) of firms. 
Then define the aggregate price level    and the aggregate wage level   in a similar way: 
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and 
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Remember that these three aggregate variables are determined by the interaction of firm 
owners, who set them for their own firm, using their own internal model-building, which in 
turn is exposed to general media influence as well as local communication. At the end of this 
section these definitions will be used to form several hypotheses about aggregate behaviour.    
But before that can be done a last big step in this nutshell model, namely the interaction 
between firm owner decisions and decisions at other nodes has to be envisaged. Quite 
generally the division of tasks between the different nodes of the network of the ruling class 
can be characterized rather simply: The state fraction has to provide stability by 
administering the part of the surplus necessary for infrastructure and maintenance of the 
monopoly of coercive power (police, law system, ideological power); while the finance 
fraction specializes in exploring new innovation possibilities, providing savings it administers 
(private and public) for promising entrepreneurial activity across different parts of the global 
economy. Referring to the diagrams in 2.1, the state’s dynamic behaviour thus works via 
taxes and public expenditures, while finance capital works via savings and credits. 
For aggregate macrodynamics the following definitions for the instruments of the state 
fraction of the ruling class are proposed: There are four essential elements, the level of 
government income flows (all forms of taxes)   , the level of government expenditure 
flows   , the structure of the income flow (wage tax as a share of total tax,     
 ), and the 
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 A more fine-grained discussion of the importance of the meso-level occupied by meso-institutions, as e.g. 
proposed by [Dopfer et al, 2004], goes beyond the scope of this text.  
structure of expenditure flows (expenditure for coercive measures as a share of total 
expenditure,   
  ). Using again diagram 1: 
      
    
    
     
      
      
                                       [9] 
Flows coming from sales or acquisitions of state-owned property are not considered in [9]. 
Such flows would only occur as a change of state savings at the bank account of the state. 
To follow the traces of class politics with respect to exploitation - a task implied by the 
arguments in the previous paragraphs - it is necessary to add an additional essential variable, 
namely the wage tax rate     
 : 
    
   
  
  
  
                                                                     [10] 
With this tax rate the state fraction of the ruling class can control what remains from gross 
wage income of workers as net income, thereby influencing the downward pressure on 
wages that can be exerted by the other fractions, firm owners and banks (e.g. via the 
interest rate on consumer credit). 
      
    
    
     
      
      
     
                        [11] 
Government expenditure for infrastructure (including different types of public goods) is 
lumped together in variable   
  (unspecified government expenditure). The other variables 
on the right hand side of [11] are just the flows that can be assigned to the recipients as 
indicated in the superscript.  
A crucial part for the understanding of activities of the capitalist state fraction is to recognize 
the distinction between expenditures to increase coercive exploitation measures,   
   (e.g. 
certain kinds of domestic police and military units) and other expenditures on infrastructure 
(  
  ) reflecting the increasing usefulness of public goods in ever more interdependent 
societies. Though the borderline between these two types in many cases is blurred, not to 
speak of the empirical coverage by official statistical units, the theoretical distinction is of 
utmost importance. In the context of this nutshell model it is simply assumed that the share 
of coercive measures is defined as 
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       [12] 
Given the monopoly of the state to exert coercive power this distinction has a further 
consequence: the possibility for the state fraction of the ruling class to deepen existing 
contradictions. With respect to external expansion this refers to developments from nation 
states to world-wide (colonial or post-colonial) empires with different rules of the game in 
different political districts. With respect to internal policies this refers to (legal and policed) 
segregations in the working class. In both cases stronger exploitation of the politically 
weakest group can be used to calm down disturbing aspirations of the strongest exploited 
group. Deepening exploitation of the weakest discriminated element has become a policy 
element vital for the survival of capitalism since the late 19th century, when the British 
working class was admitted some improved conditions that fierce colonial exploitation made 
possible. More recently post-colonial exploitation via exchange rate deterioration has 
prolonged the viability of global capitalism. With respect to internal deepening of 
exploitation ethnic segregation (e.g. in rich oil countries like Saudi Arabia) and gender 
exploitation have played a similar role31. 
The finance fraction of the ruling class determines interest rates for savings and credits of 
the other aggregated players (compare diagram 2). Profits of banks (  
 ) can be determined 
by calculating the difference between incoming (total revenues   
 ) and outgoing money 
flows (wages of bank employees  
 , and taxes paid by banks   
 ) collected by private 
households of bank owners. 
  
     
    
    
                                                      [13] 
Once profit arrives in node  
   (see diagram 1), a profit rate of the banking sector can be 
computed 
  
   
  
 
  
                                                                   [14] 
Since banking is just a service - the provision of an amount of money either before (credit) or 
after (savings) another amount of money has been transferred to the bank – physical capital 
plays a much more remote role; the amount   
  from an economic perspective is even 
harder to approximate than in the case of firms. 
Ignoring many institutional details the basic revenue generating mechanism can be 
described in the following way (compare diagram 2): 
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The banking sectors revenues are the difference between the cost of attracting savings (the 
interest paid for savings, interest rate   
    times the respective wealth of the saving entity 
   
  ) and the money received for redistributing these savings as credits (interest rates 
  
   paid for debts measured as a negative value of wealth   
 ). In [15] there are several 
implicit assumptions to be explained. As national statistics show, the standard circuit of 
flows in OECD countries after WW2 is characterized by positive savings of the household 
sector, which then is redistributed as credits to firms. Thus there has been a traditional 
dominance of the first element of the first term (  
       
 ) and the first element of the 
second term (  
      
 ) in [15].  
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 For the use of the concept of ‘diversity’ in the capitalist ‘managerial’ context compare [Hanappi-Egger, 2011]. 
In a more general way Joseph Schumpeter - following in this respect Karl Marx32 - had even 
considered this mechanism as an element of the core of the capitalist mode of production: 
Because entrepreneurs are promising to be able to pay back a high interest to their creditors 
they are forced to increase labour productivity not only by more coercive labour conditions, 
but also by new production processes and new products. The latter two by-products are the 
justification for capitalism as a necessary era in human evolution. And finance plays a central 
role by choosing whom to give credit! For Schumpeter it was evident that only those firm 
owners are entrepreneurs and should earn a positive profit, which are able to increase 
labour productivity. The financial intermediary that selected these entrepreneurs should 
then receive a share of the increased profit rate derived from successful innovation. What 
today is sometimes called investment banking therefore has a noble historical background in 
political economy. But as any other historic episode this heroic phase of capitalism has to 
end someday – and again this idea was shared by Marx and Schumpeter. As history showed 
both had the timing wrong, capitalism is alive – though its original tenet to increase global 
labour productivity hardly can be performed any more by the same type of entrepreneurial 
entity that inspired Schumpeter. The contradictions between global needs and the promise 
of quick and high profit rate expectations of private entrepreneurs (e.g. problems of 
effective demand, necessary long-run horizons for educational goals, consideration of 
environmental constraints, tailoring solutions to regional needs) have exploded. Today It is 
more and more evident that large-scale innovation in the world economy has to be a 
political task not to be left to the profit maximizing considerations of private financial firms.  
Having said this, it nevertheless becomes clear that a new democratic process, which can 
substitute old style global investment banking, is needed. Its discussion goes beyond the 
scope of this sub-chapter. But what in any case follows is that the activities of the banking 
sector will have to be split: One part will have to take care of the biggest investment 
problems of the planet (former large-scale investment banking), and the other part should 
manage the less demanding tasks of handling a global currency, or a web of connected local 
currencies – including all types of borrowing. 
The important idea for this second set of mechanisms is that it is aiming at enabling 
reproduction instead of enabling growth of a money stock, vulgo capital accumulation. This 
split of financial intermediation – reproduction versus growth – is already visible in equation 
[15]. Indeed the fact that today the credits paid by states (which are social institutions 
responsible for reproduction) to private banks (  
       
  in [15]) are part of the revenues of 
these banks expresses a dominance of the global financial intermediaries, which in a 
disastrous way forces nation states into firm-like behaviour. States are treated by big finance 
like firms: ‘Innovate and grow, or perish!’ Of course, it is not feasible to erase Greece from 
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 Since Marx wrote more than half a century earlier than Schumpeter he did not see the possibility of positive 
savings of better-of worker households in richer countries. The modern macroeconomic tools of deepening 
conflicts in one direction in order to calm down the clashes of class struggles in another domain were not fully 
visible in the mid-19
th
 century. But the positive role of capitalism in human history due to productivity increases 
certainly is a common issue emphasized by both, Marx and Schumpeter. 
Europe’s map because some parallel to firm bankruptcy is proclaimed by creditor banks. The 
physically existing reality will prevail, and the symbolic interaction taking place between the 
social classes (and the different fractions of the ruling class) will have to adjust. 
As a consequence the nutshell model will not include equation [15], but will instead propose 
two other equations taking care for the two roles of financial intermediaries that just were 
mentioned. 
First, the role of detecting global needs and allocating financial resources to be done by 
public global banking: 
    
          ∑   
   
      
                                                   [16]    
The importance of necessary global needs is being expressed by parameter    , and the 
respective contribution of each country (out of its infrastructure expenditures   
  ) is then 
adjusted by weights   
   
, which should express how much a country is able to contribute, 
and how much it is concerned by the problem33. 
Second, the role of administering continental money management with predetermined 
interest structures for local lending and saving, which just reflect administration cost at wage 
levels in the range of employees with similar education levels in other parts of the 
(European) economy. This typically would be the role of the ECB and its affiliates. 
(  
       
    
       
    
      
 )      
        
      
        
    
                     [17]  
Equation [17] expresses the proposal that money attracted by the (public) administrative 
banking sector in period     should be paid back in the next period (or with the same 
procedure in any later period) with an interest rate on credits, which also covers the cost of 
administration  
 . Since the bank is not a private firm any more profits are zero, and there 
is no incentive to treat nation states like indebted firms; rather there is the common 
objective to enable reproduction. 
Putting together the parts of this nutshell model is easy and difficult at the same time. It is 
easy because all of the quasi-physical formulations of ‘natural laws of economics’ used in 
mainstream neo-classical theory are not used, and cannot burden a search for a ‘quasi-
natural equilibrium growth path’ of the economy. All that is used from standard 
macroeconomics is the accounting framework that describes necessary ex-post relations 
between monetary aggregates. After using these definitorial relationships the remaining 
variables are considered to be determined, to be set, by the agents constituting the political 
economy. 
What, on the other hand, makes the approach extremely complicated is that agents make 
their choice with the help of an internal model, which they maintain, communicate, and 
continuously update. The core of the actual interaction that takes place thus is intricately 
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 The simple form of [16] hides a complicated political process. 
interwoven with expectation formation processes. Since each internal model used by an 
agent is an example of what Herbert Simon [Simon, 1982] has called ‘bounded rationality’ – 
it is a subjectively zoomed projection of what really is going on – there is no hope for a 
closed mathematical analysis unless bounded rationality is replaced by omniscient 
representative agents34. It is the inevitable complexity of such a model, which leads to the 
necessity to use heuristically enriched agent-based simulation. 
Nevertheless an agent’s internal model-building process could be approached by applying 
the old Newtonian framework, which was so successful in the natural sciences: Changes in 
essential variables are functions of the state of these variables, or 
 ̇   ( ).                                                                            [18]     
The dotted time derivative35 of the vector of essential variables   is assumed to be a function 
  of the current state values of these variables. An eternally correct function   therefore 
waits to be discovered, and as soon as this is done all future development can be deduced. 
Boundedly rational agents might believe in the existence of such a function, but not knowing 
it would result in the use of simple approximations. The simplest way to do so is to use linear 
approximations of the partial derivatives of the arguments of   in [18]. Using discrete time, a 
possible part of the internal model of firms might thus look as follows:  
     
             
with       (                      
    
     
      
      
     
     
  ) .     [19] 
The parameter vector         is of the same length as the vector of essential state variables 
   and is empirically estimated. It approximates how much a change of this variables would 
influence the expected aggregated innovation activity      
 . If more arguments change 
then the simplest first approximation would just add up all influences; but of course more 
sophisticated heuristic behaviours can be postulated. Another analogous parameter vector 
can be assumed for all other instruments to be set by a certain agent, and finally the 
consideration of all these proxies as a simultaneous system will lead to the possibility to 
determine a best choice of the agent’s decision set. 
Indeed, experiments with such agent-based simulations have been performed and the more 
or less continuous decline of labour productivity growth in Europe since 1945 could easily be 
modelled. But there is more to report than just the application of Newtonian methods to 
bounded rationality.  
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 Such an assumption, of course, would immediately spoil the entire scientific enterprise because if no 
knowledge accumulation is necessary, then no science would have ever been emerging. Such a ‘rational 
expectations’-approach therefore is itself completely irrational. 
35
 Note that in the natural sciences the assumption of continuous time usually is preferred to discrete time, a 
choice which is non-trivial. In the social sciences – and evolutionary theory in general – the need for at least 
two different essential time ranges suggests a preference for the assumption of a discrete time line. For details 
of this argument see [Hanappi, 2013]. 
The most interesting part of re-telling economic history by the use of this formal model 
stems from the fact that each essential variable only makes sense as long as it stays within a 
finite interval: the innovation force       is between zero and one; the price level is 
bounded below by wages and interest rates and upwards has to considered upper limits 
described by monopolistic competition; the range of tax rates is limited by basic 
infrastructural needs and maximum possible tax revenues; interest rates can only extract a 
part of the profits generated by firms and on the other hand need a minimum interest on 
households’ savings to attract money to  provide credits, etc. Most important, the real 
physical quantities derived from symbolically determined actions in the monetary sphere do 
have borderlines of feasibility: minimum food consumption, heating and health conditions 
linked to the unemployment rate, environmental deterioration, and the like. The 
countervailing forces between agents realized by the setting of their instruments in times of 
relative stability of a political regime will lead to highly irregular trajectories, some variables 
sometimes getting very close to their borders but then being repelled by instruments set 
according to re-estimated values of the  -parameters. These controlled irregular 
movements are the correlate of what mainstream theory usually calls business cycle theory. 
Contrary to the standard view in the latter, divergence – and not convergence – of essential 
variables is the rule. It is only the switch of expectation formation (sensitivity borders have 
to be made explicit, taking into account amplifiers of the communication environment) 
expressed by re-estimated -parameters, which for some time guarantees the relative 
stability of the regime. Nevertheless there is a high probability that after a somewhat longer 
time period the system gets stuck with numerous essential variables hitting limits and 
expectation models being unable to develop sufficient repelling force. This is a state of deep 
crisis calling for a change of political regime. 
At this point it is the set of essential variables itself, which has to change. For the current 
crisis the proposal made for global financial intermediation (see [16] and [17]) is a typical 
blueprint for an element of such a regime change. What has been proposed as a mid-run 
strategy for the 4th commandment in [Hanappi, 2012]36 is another example of an element of 
a new regime. How a change of the parameter set is to be carried out, the revolutionary 
dynamics needed in the physical domain can certainly not be explained by the same 
modelling framework that was used for the old relatively stable regime. There has to be a 
second class of models generalizing issues of revolutionary dynamics. A generalization of this 
kind - finding similarities in social processes that transform societies which have been 
relatively stable for many decades, even centuries – has not received sufficient theoretical 
attention yet. And of course the constant features of such a generalized model of 
revolutionary dynamics at the same time might provide some insight into the slow long-run 
progress characterized by the changing features.  
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 The 4
th
 commandment developed in this text is: ‘No unemployment is the prime goal of European economic 
policy’. The change in labor organization needed to achieve this goal is so incompatible with the current state 
of affairs that it implies indeed a new type of European governance. 
The slow dynamics of regime change are a central methodological ingredient of evolutionary 
theory. Only by modelling the opposition and interaction between slow and fast dynamics 
the evolution of living entities can be fully understood. It is clear that this topic goes far 
beyond the brief exposition of a nutshell model helping to explain the evolution of economic 
theory from 20th century macroeconomics to 21st century agent-based macro-simulation.  
 
3. Further Perspectives 
Full-fledged agent-based simulation on a macroeconomic level goes one big step further 
than the reformulations proposed in the previous chapter. It has to start by newly defining 
the agents that have to be modeled. The reason is that one of the major deficiencies of 
standard modeling was its historically inherited inability to give an adequate picture of the 
strong linkages between agents in different nation states (the globalization problem) as well 
as the important overlapping connections between economic and political agents (the 
political economy problem). Moreover the importance of agents, even their emergence and 
extinction, is changing with accelerating speed in recent decades. This makes an even more 
daring goal for ABS a necessary ingredient: To start to explain how institutions emerge and 
vanish37. But before going into its dynamics, the list of existing agents has to be produced. 
The next step is to provide a first sketch how these agents are connected. This comes up to 
an exercise in network analysis using techniques for collecting and evaluating large amounts 
of ever more available data. The model-builder in this stage has to take on the role of an 
artist to design the essentials as well as the limits of such a network. 
Once the first prototype of the network exists one can start to think about the internal 
model building process of the major agents. In general it will not be possible to infer the 
properties of these internal models (what is perceived, how models are built, what they look 
like, how they are used, etc.) by interviewing human representatives. Again the artistic skill 
of the researcher and knowledge about what surfaces in the actual political economy 
process has to substitute for much of the traditional empirical methods. Instead of well-
defined internal models of agents, there often will be only plausible (suggested by empirical 
observations) guesses concerning the partial derivatives of the agent’s reactions on events it 
observes. 
The link to standard macroeconomics typically concerns the choice of agents:  
An obvious aggregate entity is the conglomerate of firms in a certain country. It makes sense 
to divide this group into three different agents38, namely small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and financial intermediaries (banks). The 
behavioral equations in standard macroeconomics which describe firm behavior usually are 
the investment function and the labor demand function. Moreover firm behavior is implicit 
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 How acute this issue is shows the current state of the European Union (see [Hanappi, 2012]). 
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 For a more detailed argument see [Hanappi, 2012, appendix A4]. 
in the assumptions on price and output determination39. In most standard macroeconomic 
models price setting power and the employment consequences of private property of the 
means of production are assumed away by postulating the existence of perfect competition 
in commodity- and labor-markets. To transfer these two powerful instruments to a newly 
invented agent called ‘the (perfectly competitive) market’ is an implausible and ideologically 
motivated short-cut. A further important decision of firms concerns innovation. Standard 
macroeconomics, when enlarged to macroeconomic growth models, first considered 
aggregate technical progress only as exogenous, as manna falling from heaven. More 
recently at least substitution between labor-time used for production and labor-time used to 
increase productivity of production is taken care of (compare [Aghion and Howitt, 1998]). 
With ABS all these five instruments (investment, labor demand, price, output, and 
innovation) can be formalized as explicit actions in the program representing the respective 
firm group (SMEs, TNCs, banks). Since national borders play an important role for firms, each 
action also can be specified and distinguished with respect to geographical location. The 
much more detailed generalization of standard macroeconomics, which is enabled by ABS, 
of course also has its price: Full specification of all possible links would be an enormous – 
and unnecessary – task, and as a consequence the work of the model designer is to 
eliminate many possibilities, which are considered to be inessential. This model-building 
activity often has to resemble an artistic project rather than scientific work based on 
empirical observation. 
The second large agent is the set of households in a country; again from the point of view of 
ABS it has to be divided in several groups. On the one hand the grouping can follow split of 
employers (different firms, employees and bosses, plus state and international institutions) 
augmented by the groups of the young, the retired, and those doing reproductive work at 
home. In standard macroeconomics all their instruments are usually collapsed into an 
aggregate consumption function. Their leisure-work behavior again is hidden by strong 
assumptions on the power of a fictitious new agent, the perfectly competitive labor market. 
The link to demographically important decisions (education period, children, retirement 
period, etc.) in standard macroeconomics usually is completely out of focus (compare 
[Hanappi and Hanappi-Egger, 2009]). Another important area of instruments of household 
concerns the link to financial intermediaries. Recent decades have seen a diversification of 
possible actions of what used to be the simple choice of ‘consume or save’ in standard 
macroeconomics. In particular this area increasingly allows acting across national borders. 
The challenges and difficulties for ABS already mentioned in the previous paragraph apply 
again. 
Third, political institutions have to be brought into the picture by ABS. No other area has 
been so crudely modeled in standard macroeconomics, which implies that for the new 
modelers’ generation there is a wide undiscovered land. This room to move has its dangers 
too: Model-builders easily can get lost in all the institutional details surrounding the law 
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 Early critics of this view from inside the Keynesian camp have been Edward Chamberlin [Chamberlin, 1933] 
and Joan Robinson [Robinson, 1933]. Their impact on standard model-building remained very limited. 
systems that are responsible to regulate – or to pretend to regulate – this area. The most 
important intervention of ABS in this field certainly is to free macroeconomics from the 
‘Procrustes bed’ of restricting instruments of political agents to the Keynesian ideas on fiscal- 
and monetary policy40. Two main sets of activities should be distinguished: On the political 
level the central function of political entities – as opposed to capitalist firms - is to stabilize 
reproduction41, while on an evolutionary ascending scale political entities have to be 
designed to allow for changes towards more democratic self-governance42. With respect to 
the latter the flourishing development of (formal, partly game theoretic) literature on voting 
theory as well as other theoretical input from political sciences might be drawn upon to 
enhance ABS. in this respect the mission of ABS to help with respect to a new synthesis of 
the social sciences becomes particularly visible. The interaction of well-structured political 
entities seems to be extraordinary difficult to mimic in ABS. On this research frontier current 
modeling often is still only producing prototypes of archetypical network evolution that shall 
resemble political organization. While political entities traditionally were thought of only 
setting a more or less fixed and stable framework within which economic agents then are 
following their goals, the recently observed increase of extremely tight connections between 
political and economic actions (e.g. activities of TNCs and national economic policies) 
question the traditional view. The almost complete blinding out of political entities by 
standard macroeconomics thus can be understood as a historical fact, but makes less and 
less sense for today’s world. And again, like with the other agent modeling generalizations, 
the task ahead of ABS is enormous. 
And this task does not stop at identifying the diverse macroeconomic agents. Once a 
proposal for such a network is made, the next step is to bring it to life by adding internal 
model building to each of the nodes. Internal model building consists of several steps: 
perception, feeding new data to the model, maintenance of the model (including 
communication and eventual innovation), and deduction of actions derived from the internal 
model (compare [Hanappi, 2011]). Conception and computational demands are again 
tremendous and to start with the sparsest settings cannot be avoided. But keeping in mind 
that model-builders in biology (e.g. brain modeling) already are successfully developing 
large-scale models at the cutting-edge of computer technology any too pessimist attitude of 
social scientists43 should forbid itself. The future of evolutionary modeling is out there 
waiting for the next generation of transdisciplinarily educated scientists to explore it. 
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 Compare [Hanappi, 2004]. 
41
 The distinction between capitalist firms and (democratic) states is a central issue in [Hanappi, 2012].   
42
 Self-governance of quickly enlarging political entities (e.g. from national units to continental units) 
necessarily increases the danger of bureaucratic impasse and misuse, e.g. bribery and hold-up cost. A vast new 
literature on these phenomena (e.g. [Krause and Meier, 2003]) might well be considered for ABS modeling. 
43
 The organization structure of globally working research teams in the social sciences will certainly be a major 
hurdle to be taken soon. The current individualistic, journal-oriented academic culture dominated by tradition 
preserving editors is doing more harm to scientific progress as is commonly understood.  
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